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Public Administration and Shared Power: 
Understanding Cooperation 
H. George Frederickson and David S. T. Matkin 
University of Kansas 
 
Introduction 
 Much of the work of modern public administration has been appropriately referred to as 
power sharing (Kettl, 1993).  Because almost all public administrators work for or represent 
jurisdictions, power sharing between jurisdictions is best described as interjurisdictional 
cooperation.  In this little study of interjurisdictional cooperation we begin with a description of 
the jurisdiction in the context of the so-called end of geography—the forces and factors that 
compel cooperation.  We then turn to a brief review of the literature on interjurisdictional 
cooperation in American metropolitan areas, and particularly in greater Kansas City.  We 
conclude with a description of findings from a recent experimental study of the propensity of 
local officials in greater Kansas City to cooperate.    
Jurisdiction and the End of Geography 
Traditional public administration is entirely based on assumptions of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction 
is a place, a rooted territory defined by precise frontiers, boundaries that describe the spaces within 
and without. The jurisdiction has constitutions, laws, regulations, sovereignty or autonomy, and, not 
least, taxing authority.  And, jurisdiction accounts for residency, citizenship, patriotism, and civil 
society.    Jurisdiction also defines itself by what it is not: it is not a social group, it is not a religious 
group, it is not a racial group, it is not a language (Guehenno 1995, p. 4).  Jurisdictions reflect the 
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special circumstances that prevailed at the time they were established and the boundaries of their 
territory were determined.  As circumstances have changed, most jurisdictional boundaries have 
stayed the same.  Jurisdictions are spatially arranged horizontally--such as Canada, the United States, 
and Mexico—and vertically--such as the United States, the state of California, Los Angeles County, 
the city of Santa Monica.   In a literal sense these spatially expressed jurisdictions are both the places 
where public administrators work and the governments that employ them.   
 Jurisdiction lacks meaning without power and authority.  In democratic governmental 
traditions, power and authority are conveyed through a generalized popular commitment to 
preestablished constitutions, to electoral based representation, to legislatively passed law and the 
executive execution of the law.  Jurisdictions claim sovereignty over territory, sovereignty 
understood to be “supreme authority within a territory” an authority based on “some mutually 
acknowledged source of legitimacy—natural law, divine mandate, hereditary law, a constitution, 
even international law (Philpott 2001).  Nation-states are unitary, which is to say they presume to 
contain all power and sovereignty over their territory and people.  In fact, however, all nation-states 
are either regionally decentralized or federated with multiple subgovernments claiming territorial 
jurisdiction and exercising either formal or delegated power in a downward diffusion of sovereignty.  
Under these arrangements each of us is a national citizen as well as a state, county, city, and school 
district resident and therefore subject to multiple layers of sovereign claims, constitutions, laws, 
regulations, and taxes.  In their professional lives government leaders execute the work of 
territorially based governments and subgovernments including cities, counties, and special districts 
each with their share of sovereignty, their charter and ordinances, and their taxes. 
 There is a widely acknowledged mismatch between jurisdictional boundaries and 
jurisdictional problems.  At the level of the nation-state, Daniel Bell describes it this way:  “(T)he 
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nation is becoming too small for the big problems of life, and too big for the small problems of life.  
It is too small for the big problems because there are no effective international mechanisms to deal 
with such things as capital flows, commodity imbalances, the loss of jobs, and the several 
demographics tidal waves that will be developing in the next twenty years.  It is to big for the small 
problems because the flow of power to a national political center means that the center becomes 
increasingly unresponsive to the variety and diversity of local needs.  In short, there is a mismatch of 
scale.” (1993, p. 12)  In American metropolitan areas, high levels of suburbanization and 
jurisdictional fragmentation have deeply eroded the capacity of metropolitan areas to deal with their 
problems.  Rural county lines drawn in the era of horse and buggy now make little sense.  The 
problems faced by the least advantaged of us—crime, drugs, little or no public transportation, 
chronic underemployment, inadequate affordable housing, air and water pollution—ignore 
arbitrarily drawn jurisdictional boundaries and tend not to stay put.  The match between jurisdictions 
and the problem faced by those who live in jurisdictions is getting weaker and weaker.  But, short of 
war or scandal, it is politically very difficult to change jurisdictional boundaries. 
   Threats to our national security are as likely to come from stateless terrorist groups as from 
other countries.  Changes in the European and Asian economy are as likely to influence our 
economy as vice versa.  The global economy challenges jurisdictionally based systems of taxation, 
particularly as more transactions are made over the Internet.  And because of the Internet, American 
laws against, for example, child pornography and gambling are extremely difficult to enforce.  The 
mobility of capital is so great that nation-states, states, and cities now constitute markets in which 
firms shop for low wages, favorable tariffs, tax breaks, and lax regulation.  With the freedom of 
human mobility, both physically and literally, people with resources can find places favorable to 
their interests, homes abroad, off-shore tax shelters, and the like.  The capacity of the state to deal 
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with complex social and economic issues has eroded significantly.  Crime, for example, often has its 
origins in other jurisdictions.  Acid rain and water pollution start in one set of jurisdictions and 
profoundly affect many others.  The oceans, seas, and rivers are polluted by sewage and fertilizer 
run-off.  Immigrants and a growing number of refugees move across porous borders.  Infectious 
diseases pay no attention to jurisdiction.  As the borders and the sovereignty of jurisdictions decline 
in importance, there is a corresponding decline in the capacity of jurisdictions to contain many 
public policy issues and, therefore, in the jurisdictions’ ability to manage them. 
 The territory or space of the jurisdiction is of dwindling importance now that agriculture, 
natural resources extraction, and industry represent a decreasing portion of economic activity.  The 
value of space is diminishing, replaced by the increasing value of competent people.  The value of 
space for production is declining while the value of space for occupation, and particularly space with 
great natural beauty or space in interesting and vibrant cities, is increasing (Florida, 2004).   
 Wealth is less and less tangible and increasingly abstract and immaterial.  The traditional 
links between wealth and territory are rapidly declining.  Value is changing from agriculture, 
industry, extraction, and exploitation and moving toward connecting-- connecting those who know 
with those who need to know, those selling with those buying, entertainers with those wishing to be 
entertained, authors with readers, and so forth.  Being plugged into the right networks and knowing 
how to be effective in these networks is value.  In the modern world of telecommunications, 
networks transcend territory and space, transcend jurisdiction and sovereignty, and, far too often, 
transcend the rule of law.  
 In a world in which wealth is less tangible and more abstract, how shall it be taxed?  In 
modern democracies all forms of taxation have a territorial basis—taxes on property, income, and 
transactions.   People and corporations are increasingly mobile—moving to avoid taxes if they are 
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rich, to find work if they are poor, or to sell their work at the highest price if they have particular 
skills.  What will it come to mean to state and local governments as increasing percentages of sales 
are over the internet and as increasing numbers of residents earn their incomes elsewhere?     
   Jurisdictions of all types – nation-states, states, provinces, cities, counties, and special 
districts – are losing their borders (Strange 1996).  The new global economy and the internet are 
described as “the end of geography.”  The revolution in telecommunications has forever altered the 
meaning of physical space and thereby forever altered the importance of borders and boundaries, a 
primary element of the idea of jurisdiction.  These changes in economics and telecommunications 
have changed human social relationships, particularly relationships between those who are 
educationally, economically, or politically significant and their places of residence or their 
citizenship.  These people are linked less and less to a single specific locale or jurisdiction and are 
linked more and more bicoastally, transnationally, or globally. Thus the sovereignty of jurisdictions-
-nation-states as well as their sub-governments--is evaporating out the top, leaking out the sides, and 
seeping out the bottom. Under these changing conditions the most important feature of contemporary 
public administration is the declining relationship between jurisdiction and public management. 
Responses to the Declining Salience of Jurisdiction
 Responses to the declining salience of jurisdiction and the end of geography are fractal, 
irregular spatial and territorial adaptations to the macro-forces of centralization and micro-forces of 
fragmentation.  The forces of centralization, to included regionalization and globalization, and the 
forces of fragmentation including localization and community based governance, unite in all spatial 
scales.  “There is little, and maybe nothing, that is global that does not have some sort of local 
manifestation.  And each local manifestation changes the global context.  Place centeredness is the 
amalgam of global change and local identity.” (O’Riordan andChurch, 2001, p.3) 
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 The best way to grasp the dynamics of responses to the declining salience of jurisdiction and 
the end of geography is to view “them as an endless series of distant proximities in which the forces 
pressing for greater globalization (or centralization) and those including greater localization 
interactively play themselves out…One quickly discovers that distant proximities are not simple 
interrelationships…Distant proximities encompass the tension between core and periphery, between 
national and transnational systems between communitariansm  and cosmopolitanism, between 
cultures and subcultures, between states and markets, between urban and rural, between integration 
and disintegration, between centralization and decentralization, between universalism and 
particularism, and between pace and space.” (Roseneau, 2003, pp. 4-5)  In a formal and authoritative 
sense, formal governmental jurisdictions engage the tensions associated with distant proximities.  
But, because many is not most of the forces encompassed in distant proximities transcend 
jurisdiction, jurisdictions have only two ways to deal with them—force or cooperation.       
 Two particularly useful bodies of literature and theory inform our understanding of the 
dynamic patterns of interjurisdictional cooperation—studies of the European Union and studies of 
American metropolitan areas (Hooghe and Marks, 2003).  From these studies we can make the 
following generalizations:  (1) jurisdictions seldom change their boundaries and seldom disappear; 
(2) special purpose jurisdictions are established to respond to changing circumstances or particular 
discontinuities, leaving general purpose jurisdictions in place; (3) jurisdictions cooperate with other 
jurisdictions in a wide variety of formal and informal power sharing arrangements to respond 
collectively to changing circumstances or particular discontinuities; (4) in the absence of formal 
polities (states, cities, etc.) formal and informal patterns of interjurisdictional power sharing 
arrangements are uniquely bureaucratic.  In view of these generalizations, public administration is at 
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least a primary means, if not the primary means, by which jurisdictions adapt and respond to 
declining sovereignty, the end of geography, and the forces of distant proximity.     
Patterns of Jurisdictional Cooperation in American Metropolitan Areas 
Theories of interests, competition, and winners and losers are the dominant political science 
perspective used to analyze the relationships of interacting organizations and individuals.  In 
response to the declining salience of jurisdiction, public administration, both as a practice and as a 
body of scholarship, has repositioned itself (Frederickson, 1999).  Modern public administration is 
based on cooperation, power sharing, and the practices of administrative conjunction, defined as “the 
array and character of formal and informal association between actors representing units in a 
networked public and the administrative behavior of those actors.”  (Frederickson, 1999, p. 708)   
In Kansas City based research it was determined that: (1)interjurisdictional conjunction is a mostly 
administrative phenomenon.  “(P)olitics—campaigns, elections, offices, titles—are jurisdictional, 
autonomous, and only slightly interdependent.  Administration is, by comparison, highly 
interdependent.  This interdependence has resulted in extensive conjunction and remarkably 
organized patterns of self-cooperation. (Frederickson, 1999, 708); (2) public management 
professionals work for their jurisdictions.  Yet, from the perspective of their policy specializations, 
they appear to serve a larger, inchoate public; (3) public management professionals engaged in 
conjunction appear to practice a form of “representation” of a generalized “public interest” 
extending well beyond their jurisdictions.  
 Administrative conjunction in greater Kansas City is importantly facilitated by the local 
“council of governments,” the Mid-America Regional Council (MARC).  City officials engaged 
in multi-jurisdictional cooperation most frequently cite MARC as a key facilitator or convening 
venue in their cooperative enterprises (Wood, 2004).   Service delivery is the most common form 
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of cooperation, followed by public works (Pagano, 1999, Wood, 2004).  Those practicing 
administrative conjunction most often cite economies of scale and service standardization as the 
most important rationales for cooperation, followed by efficiency and cost savings (Wood, 
2004).   
 Metropolitan administrative conjunction could be fairly described as “picket fence 
regionalism,” a pattern of formal and informal cooperation within specific policy arenas such a 
law enforcement or public works (Thurmaier and Wood, 2002).  Metropolitan administrative 
conjunction does not exhibit patterns of informal or formal cooperation between policy arenas 
(Wood, 2004) 
 Administrative conjunction is elsewhere referred to as collaborative public management.  
In an extensive study of patterns of economic development collaboration, Robert Agranoff and 
Michael McGuire indicate that “collaborative arrangements are a unique institutional form, 
consisting of processes different from the spontaneous coordination of markets or the conscious 
management of hierarchy (Powell, 1990).  A critical issue to understand is why collaboration 
emerges at all and, if we are to believe the expanding research on the topic, why collaboration is 
increasing in incidence and importance.  One dominant perspective argues that the pace and 
quality of social change at this point in history are the primary determinants of collaborative 
management. . . . Just as the bureaucratic organization was the signature organizational form 
during the industrial age, the emerging information or knowledge age gives rise to less rigid, 
more permeable structures, where persons are able to link across internal functions, 
organizational boundaries, and even geographic boundaries (2003, p. 23).” 
 Agranoff and McGuire found wide variations in patterns of city cooperation—
jurisdiction-based cities which aggressively cooperated vertically and horizontally to further their 
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economic development interests; donor-recipient cities that were less active in horizontal 
cooperation while actively seeking state and federal aid; top-down cities which emphasized 
vertical compliance through internal hierarchies; and low-activity cities only slightly engaged in 
cooperation.   Among their conclusions, Agranoff and McGuire indicate that:  (1) “in the absence 
of the legal charter, people join, work, and remain together because some element of trust exists.  
Trust in collective behavior is linked to the obligation not to do unnecessary harm to another 
party’s interests.” (p. 182); and, (2) “managers may also find that the public or collective good, 
as manifested in a shared belief or common purpose, contributes to holding the collaboration 
together.” (p. 183).   
 Experimental research using game theory is among the most interesting and useful ways 
to determine why people cooperate and to understand under what conditions cooperation is likely 
to emerge. Axelrod (1984) used prisoner dilemma games in his classic study of cooperation.  
According to Axelrod, cooperation can be explained as a consequence of individuals pursuing 
their own self-interest even without the coordination or influence of a central authority.  Trust, an 
essential element of long-term cooperation, is developed as self-interested individuals participate 
in multiple iterations of prisoner dilemma games.  Cooperation develops because individuals 
integrate their interest in future interactions into their present decisions based on increasing trust 
of other players.   
 Based on his application of the prisoner’s dilemma game, Axelrod proposed several ways 
to promote cooperation which should be carefully considered by local government officials.  One 
of Axelrod’s core arguments regarding the promotion of mutual cooperation is that the “future is 
sufficiently important relative to the present (p.126).”  Mutual cooperation depends on 
individuals viewing proximal decision as not only effecting immediate payoffs but the payoffs 
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they expect in the future.  Axelrod argues that small groups who frequently interact are most 
likely to achieve stable and enduring mutual cooperation.  This stability in cooperation is 
possible because the short-run benefit for defection is less than the perceived benefit for long-run 
cooperation. 
 Following Axelrod, payoffs do not need to be measurable on an absolute scale.  The 
possibility of a sanction is also not required.  Rather, the payoffs for cooperation and defection 
must be in the proper order.  The benefit for defection is always better, in any one interaction, for 
a participant, regardless of the other party’s choice.  If participate A chooses to participate, then 
B will get the most benefit by defecting.  If A chooses to defect, B is still better off to choose 
defection.  The amount of points, scores, tokens, or other benefits is not important, only that the 
order is followed. 
An Experimental Study of the Propensity to Cooperate   
 Our study vulgarizes Axelrod’s approach to game theory and departs from it in two 
important ways.  First, he uses games with two players.  Our questionnaire is based on the 
perspective of one local government official amongst many other officials in cities and counties 
that might possibly cooperate.  Second, while our scenario of payoff’s follows Axelrod’s 
suggested payoff order, our sucker’s payoff (a sucker’s payoff is when you cooperate and the 
other player defects) does not result in the city taking on all the costs with no reward, but rather 
the cost will exceed the desired level of expected benefits. This element of the game was 
changed in order to reflect the reality of intergovernmental cooperation. Typically, city officials 
will negotiate on possible cooperation knowing before hand how many cities must participate in 
order for the agreement to be made.   
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 To explore intergovernmental cooperation in metropolitan regions, we mailed 
questionnaires to 654 elected and administrative officials in the Kansas City metropolitan area.  
The questionnaires described a scenario in which respondents were asked to assume their current 
government position in the hypothetical town of “Hometown, U.S.A.”  Respondents were 
provided with information on the demographics, economic base, historical trends, and financial 
condition of Hometown, and the metropolitan region, New Hamilton, in which Hometown is 
located.  Respondents were then provided with information on an information technology project 
that may be developed in greater New Hamilton.  Local government officials in several cities in 
New Hamilton have agreed to undertake the project if 10 local government’s agree to cooperate.  
The respondent must then make a decision on their willingness to participate in the project, given 
a set of possible risks and benefits to Hometown.   
 After having selected their willingness to participate on a scale from 1 (don’t participate) 
to 7 (participate), respondents were then asked to turn over the questionnaire and read some 
additional information and then make a second decision.  Respondents randomly received one of 
two addition information scenarios.  Both scenarios explained that a regional council had 
conducted a study of the proposed development and found that residents of several New 
Hamilton jurisdictions whose leadership was not expected to participate would receive benefits 
from the cooperative.  One scenario stated that residents from non-cooperating jurisdictions 
would receive significant benefits should 10 cities cooperate, regardless of whether Hometown 
cooperates.  In the second scenario, the benefits to these residents would be slight.  The wording 
of the two additional scenarios was identical, except for the use of the words “significant” and 
“slight.” 
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 Our questionnaire was developed with the assistance of the Mid-American Regional 
Council (MARC) staff, which ensured that the scenario was realistic and represented a plausible 
intergovernmental cooperative process in the Kansas City metropolitan area.   
 The questionnaire was sent to elected, appointed, and administrative officials in the 
Kansas City metropolitan area. We based our selection of administrative position to survey on 
the position titles that are most common in the Kansas City metro.  Questionnaires were sent to 
mayors, council members, aldermen, chief administrative officers, assistant administrative 
officers, chiefs of police, parks and recreation directors, and public works directors.  154 surveys 
were returned, constituting a 23.5% response rate.  We expected a small response rate from 
elected officials, due to time delays in delivering mail to elected officials through city hall staff 
screening so we over sampled elected officials (62% of surveys) compared to administrative 
officials.  Still, the response rate for administrative officials was 31.7%, and 18.5% for elected 
officials. 
 In addition to the data on decisions to participate in the regional program, the 
questionnaire gathered information on several of the characteristics of officials and their 
jurisdictions.  Respondents indicated the number of years they have been in their current 
position, how often they meet with their counterparts in other jurisdictions to discuss regional 
programs/issues, and how much of their time is spent working on regional programs/issues.  
Various individual characteristics were also gathered on the questionnaire (i.e. age, gender, racial 
category, and education level).   
 Each questionnaire was coded in order to identify the type of official and their 
jurisdiction.  The 2000 U.S. Census was used to calculate the percentage of regional population 
in each official’s jurisdiction.  This variable was calculated by dividing the jurisdictions 
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population by the total regional population—region was defined by the jurisdictions service by 
MARC.   
 The metropolitan area was divided into four quadrants and each respondent was coded as 
to the corresponding quadrant for their jurisdiction.  The first quadrant comprises the northwest 
corner of the metropolitan area.  This quadrant includes the Unified Government of Wyandotte 
County, Kansas City, Kansas and Leavenworth County, both in Kansas.  The Unified 
Government represents the most prominent jurisdictional consolidation in the Kansas City metro.  
The second quadrant is comprises the northeast corner the metropolitan area and includes Platte, 
Clay, and Ray counties, all in Missouri.  The third quadrant comprises the southwest corner of 
the metropolitan area and includes Johnson County, Kansas and a few cities in Jackson County, 
Missouri that are on the southwest side of Main Street in Kansas City, Missouri.   The fourth 
quadrant comprises the southeast corner of the metropolitan area and includes Kansas City, 
Missouri, the Core City in the metropolitan area.  This quadrant includes all of Jackson County, 
Missouri east of Main Street in Kansas City Missouri and Cass County.   
Data and Methods 
In the following section we describe our analysis and present our findings.  The 
descriptive results and variable descriptions for our dependent and independent variables are 
presented in Table 1.  Correlation coefficients for all independent variables are presented in 
Table 2.  Correlation coefficients provide a quick check for possible colinearity problems, 
though correlations are not a precise diagnostic. 
 Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the first and second decision to cooperate by 
type of official.  Mayors and CAOs have the highest average response on the 1st decision, 5.667 
and 5.429 respectively.  The average response for council members is nearly a full point lower 
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than the mayoral average and is the lowest of all officials on the first decision at 4.879.  It 
appears that the executive functions are the most willing to cooperate in regional functions and 
that the legislative positions are the least inclined to cooperate.  This finding supports 
Frederickson’s theory of administrative conjunction which argues that the power and focus of the 
legislative office is focused on internal jurisdictional boundaries and is therefore less likely to 
engage in interjurisdictional power sharing.  This finding also supports viewing elected executive 
officials as more similar to appointed administrative executives than may have been previously 
considered. 
 For each group, the decision to cooperate decreased when respondents discovered in the 
second decision scenario that other regional residents would benefit from the regional 
cooperation even though the leadership in these jurisdictions was not expected to participate in 
the cooperative.  Each category of respondents were less inclined to cooperate when they learned 
there would be slight benefits for residents in other jurisdictions than when they learned that 
these benefits to residents of other jurisdictions would be significant.  Finally, as predicted, 
among our respondents elected members of city councils were least inclined to cooperate.  
Without statistical controls, however, these observations are only descriptive.  So, we turn to 
regression models and the parameter estimates from these models. 
Regression Model 1 
 The dependent variable for our first model is the respondents willingness to cooperate in 
the 1st decision.  The variable is on an ordered scale from “1” (don’t participate) to “7” 
(participate).  As we do not assume respondents to consider the 1-7 scale as continuous, with 
equal distances between each ordered value, we have chosen to use an ordered logit regression 
model (Long, 1997).i  
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 The maximum likelihood estimates from the ordered logit regression analysis are 
presented in table 4.  The results support the Axelrod hypothesis, the Wood research results, and 
Agranoff and McGuire’s findings to the effect that experience with interlocal collaboration 
increases the probability of cooperation on future projects.  Collaboration begets cooperation.  
Increased frequency of interjurisdictional meetings between officials leads to an increased 
propensity to cooperate.  Our second finding is the physical distance between the metropolitan 
center city and the official’s jurisdiction decreases the willingness to cooperate in regional 
programs.  Third, we found that officials in quadrant 1 were more likely to cooperate, compared 
to the center city quadrant.  Quadrant 1 contains a consolidated city/county and this finding 
supports Axelrod and Wood’s positions that past patterns of cooperation are likely to lead to 
future cooperation.  Fourth, mayoral officials demonstrated a significantly higher willingness to 
cooperate than other officials.  This finding suggests that mayors may not be as jurisdictionally 
focused as was previously thought.    
 The most probable response for a typical official who never meets with regional 
counterparts is “5” or a slight willingness to cooperate.  Once officials begin to meet monthly, 
their most probably response increases to “6”.  These results support Axelrod’s position that 
cooperation evolves from frequent interaction.  Officials who spend little to no time meeting 
with their regional counterparts only have a .50 probability that they will be favorable toward 
cooperation (a score of 5, 6, or 7).  Compare those findings with officials who report at least 
weekly meetings.  Officials that meet at least weekly have a .90 probability to be favorable 
toward cooperation and .70 probability that they will be moderately to highly favorable.  
Interjurisdictional interaction begets cooperation. 
Regression Model 2  
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 After analyzing respondents first decision to cooperate, we then looked at how the second 
scenarios effected their decision to cooperate.  In order to analyze how the second scenario 
changed official’s willingness to cooperate, we generated a new variable of decision change by 
taking the difference between the 2nd and the 1st decisions.  The range for decision change is -6 to 
+2.  As the intervals between each unit in this variable are not assumed to be equal, we used an 
ordered logit regression model to estimate the parameters. 
 Table 4 summarizes the parameter estimates and fit statistics for our second model.   The 
affect of the 2nd scenario on the decision to cooperate is significant.  The second decision obliges 
an official to indicate their propensity to cooperate even when they know that the leadership in 
other jurisdictions will not cooperate—the free riders—and that their residents will benefit.  In 
game theoretic terms, some of the other possible cooperators defected.  In one scenario the 
benefits to free riders in jurisdictions in which officials defected would be great, in the other 
scenario, slight.  In either case, in classic game theoretic terms, the appropriate response on the 
part of a player to defection on the part of one or more other players is to also defect, to avoid 
being a “sucker.”  Our findings indicate that our players generally defected in the face of benefits 
to others, but tended to be less inclined to defect if the benefits were significant for the residents 
of their jurisdictions and more inclined to defect when the benefits were slight.  It appears, 
therefore, that Hometown officials are initially inclined to participate when the game is fair and 
continue to cooperate if the greater good or the public interest outweighs the fact that the 
leadership of some jurisdictions ride free while the residents of Hometown and 10 other cities do 
not. 
 The next finding in our second regression model is that mayoral, CAO/Assistant, and 
Department Directors are likely to respond more negatively to other jurisdictions free riding than 
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council members.  In contrast to legislative officials, whose focus is more jurisdictionally based, 
executive and administrative officials are more likely to respond negatively to the unwillingness 
of the leadership in other jurisdictions to participate.  This finding suggests that the expectation 
of reciprocal cooperation is a strong executive norm.  Willingness to participate in cooperative 
agreements therefore is determined in part by perceptions that other jurisdictional leaders are not 
free riding at the expense of ones own jurisdiction. 
 The third finding is that officials in the central city quadrant are expected to respond 
more negatively to the free riding jurisdictions than any other metropolitan quadrant.  Central 
cities often bare unequaled service delivery and coordination burdens in the metropolitan area.  
Central city officials may be more concerned about free riders than other quadrants because of an 
existing concern about free riding that is not prevalent in other jurisdictions.  Thus, we should 
expect central city officials to resist cooperate when the cost/benefit ratios are more generous for 
other jurisdictions. 
 Our vulgar application of game theoretic experimental protocols was designed to evaluate 
the propensity of jurisdiction based officials to cooperate.  Because information technology is 
indifferent to borders and sovereignty, it is an ideal policy arena for interjurisdictional 
cooperation.  We learn that jurisdictions matter to officials and that jurisdictional self-interest 
can, under the right circumstances, lead to regional cooperation.  Jurisdictional officials appear to 
“learn” to cooperate with and trust officials from other jurisdictions with whom they collaborate 
or cooperate.  We also learn that asymmetries in cooperation tend to matter less if there are 
enough cooperators and if the overall benefits are significant.    
 17
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Analysis 
 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev Min Max Description 
1st Decision 153 5.131 1.463 1 7 “1” Don’t Participate 
“4” Undecided 
“7” Participate 
2nd Decision 152 4.592 1.641 1 7 Same as Above 
Decision Change 151 -.543 1.100 -6 2 Difference between 2nd and 
1st Decisions 
CAO / Assistant 154 0.273 - 0 1 “0” All other officials 
“1” CAO/Assistant 
Mayor 154 0.058 - 0 1 “0” All other officials 
“1” Mayor 
City Council Member 154 0.429 - 0 1 “0” All other officials 
“1” City Council Members 
Dept. Director 143 0.240 - 0 1 “0” All other officials 
“1” Department Director 
Age 152 50.408 11.618 25 77 Age in years 
Education Level 153 2.431 .972 0 5 “0” High School Degree 
“1” Some College 
“2” Four-year college 
degree 
“3” Masters degree 
“4” J.D. or equivalent 
“5” Ph.D. or equivalent 
Years in Current 
Position 
150 6.01 5.730 0.5 35 # Years in Current Position 
Gender 152 0.217 - 0 1 “0” Male 
“1” Female 
Time Spent on 
Regional 
Programs/Issues 
148 2.230 1.386 0 5 “0” = None 
“1” = Seldom (<4%) 
“2” = Occasional (5%-9%) 
“3” = Routinely (10%-25%) 
“4” = Often (>25%) 
Frequency of Meeting 
with Regional 
Counterparts 
147 2.429 1.365 0 6 “0” = Never 
“1” = Annual or Semi-
annual  
“2” = Quarterly 
“3” = Monthly or Bimonthly 
“4” = Biweekly 
“5” = Weekly 
“6” = Multi-weekly 
Portion of Regional 
Population in 
Jurisdiction (ln) 
154 0.281 1.574 -3.65 3.79 ln (Jurisdiction Population / 
Total Regional Population) 
North Kansas 
(Quadrant 1) 
154 0.084 - 0 1 “0” All other quadrants 
“1” Quadrant 1 
North Missouri 
(Quadrant 2) 
154 0.214 - 0 1 “0” All other quadrants 
“1” Quadrant 2 
South Kansas 
(Quadrant 3) 
154 0.403 - 0 1 “0” All other quadrants 
“1” Quadrant 3 
South Missouri 
(Quadrant 4) 
154 0.299 - 0 1 “0” All other quadrants 




Table 2: Correlations of Independent Variables 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Scenario 1.000         
2 CAO 0.006 1.000        
3 Mayor -0.077 -0.149 1.000       
4 Councilmember -0.033 -0.536 -0.213 1.000      
5 Department Director 0.074 -0.342 -0.136 -0.489 1.000     
6 Age 0.058 -0.380 0.144 0.258 0.019 1.000    
7 Yrs of Education -0.050 0.240 -0.139 -0.059 -0.108 -0.128 1.000   
8 Yrs in Current Position -0.049 -0.011 -0.057 0.021 0.018 0.133 0.136 1.000  
9 Gender -0.102 0.048 -0.058 0.140 -0.182 -0.077 -0.043 -0.048 1.000 
10 Time Working on Regional Issues -0.067 0.023 0.226 -0.168 0.050 -0.041 0.065 0.069 -0.029 
11 Time Meeting with Regional Counterparts -0.064 0.173 0.078 -0.349 0.183 -0.144 0.144 0.062 -0.072 
12 Quadrant 1 0.161 0.041 0.036 -0.010 -0.051 0.104 -0.080 0.023 -0.042 
13 Quadrant 2 0.015 -0.017 0.020 -0.049 0.065 0.099 -0.071 -0.106 0.003 
14 Quadrant 3 -0.178 0.015 -0.012 -0.021 0.015 -0.079 0.106 0.114 0.077 
15 Quadrant 4 0.080 -0.025 -0.027 0.073 -0.044 -0.067 -0.001 -0.040 -0.059 
16 Miles from City Center -0.077 0.084 0.172 -0.111 -0.052 -0.128 -0.210 -0.036 -0.051 
17 lnPerPopulation 0.161 0.036 -0.141 0.053 -0.023 0.088 0.257 0.016 -0.145 
           
           
  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17  
13 Time Working on Regional Issues 1.000         
14 Time Meeting with Regional Counterparts 0.502 1.000        
15 Quadrant 1 0.023 -0.004 1.000       
16 Quadrant 2 -0.126 -0.117 -0.159 1.000      
17 Quadrant 3 0.072 0.107 -0.246 -0.428 1.000     
18 Quadrant 4 0.023 -0.007 -0.199 -0.345 -0.534 1.000    
19 Miles from City Center -0.129 -0.079 0.132 -0.185 -0.080 0.171 1.000   
20 lnPerPopulation 0.079 0.031 0.004 -0.227 -0.048 0.253 -0.373 1.000  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Decisions by Type of Official 
Type of Official 1st Decision 2nd Decision 
  
Significant Benefit 
to Other Residents 
Slight Benefit to 
Other Residents 
CAO 5.429 5.286 4.875 
  0.598 0.611 0.991 
  21 14 8 
Assistant CAO 5.35 4.900 4.000 
  0.988 1.37 1.054 
  20 10 10 
Mayor 5.667 6.000 1.500 
  1.803 0.632 0.707 
  9 6 2 
Council Member 4.879 4.900 3.920 
  1.696 1.614 1.956 
  66 40 25 
Police Chief 5.105 4.800 4.000 
  1.761 2.251 1.803 
  19 10 9 
5.100 5.00 4.167 Public Works 
Director 1.287 0.816 1.722 
  10 4 6 
5.375 5.000 3.000 Parks & Recreation 
Director 0.916 1.000 2.000 
  8 5 3 
Data includes mean response, standard deviation, and sample size. 
Decisions are scored: “7” participate, “4” undecided, “1” don’t participate 
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Table 4: Maximum Likelihood Ordered Logistics Results  
































































   
N 144 143 
Model χ² 32.93*** 47.93*** 
Log Likelihood -208.398 -165.194 
Percent Correctly Predicted (count R²) 35.4% 55.2% 
Cut Point 1 -4.544 -4.535 
Cut Point 2 -4.182 -2.616 
Cut Point 3 -3.689 -0.764 
Cut Point 4 -2.856 0.615 
Cut Point 5 -1.335 4.152 
Cut Point 6 1.082 6.051 




                                                 
i Refer to Long’s Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables, chapter 5, for a technical 
description of Maximum Likelihood Order Logit models.  Long provides an excellent explanation for why logit, or 
probit, models are better than OLS models in estimating and interpreting the effect of predictor variables on ordinal 
dependent variables.  These reasons include that logit and probit models will not allow for probability predictions 
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please Complete and Return in Enclosed Reply Envelope 
 
Your Role: 
As you complete this brief questionnaire, think of yourself as an experienced and well respected local government 
official in the fictional city of Hometown.  Your position in Hometown is the same as the one you currently hold as 
a public official in the real world. 
 
About Hometown, USA: 
o Population: 20,000. 
o Suburban city in a large metropolitan area, New Hamilton. 
o Modest population growth of 2% over the past 10 years. 
o Primary revenue sources: property and sales tax. 
o General revenues have been sufficient to cover current expenditures and maintain a 1% general fund 
balance over the past 10 years. 
o Unemployment rate has been consistently below the regional median. 
o Maintains a full assortment of city services. 
 
About New Hamilton: 
o 80 cities and townships, 7 counties, and 2 states.   
o Nearly 2 million people. 
o Economy based on a mix of service and manufacturing industries.   
 
The Situation: 
A highly respected technology company, TechCo, is in the final stages of developing an innovative information 
system that promises to substantially improve municipal services in urban regions.  TechCo wants to partner with 
cities in New Hamilton to finish the development of their information system.   
 
You were assigned to lead an important task force to decide whether or not Hometown should agree to join in a 
partnership with TechCo and other cities in New Hamilton.  You will report your decision to the governing body of 
Hometown, who will most likely follow your recommendation.  After multiple presentations and discussions, you 
and your team are 100% convinced that TechCo’s project is credible and will improve service delivery in your city.   
 
Assessing the Partnership:   
There is a high fixed cost associated with TechCo’s project.  The cities in New Hamilton decide that at least 10 
cities must commit to the TechCo project or the project will not be undertaken. The fixed cost must be covered by 
the cities which agree to be partners.  Therefore, as more cities participate, the cost to each individual city is lower.   
 
You are confident there is enough support amongst New Hamilton cities that at least 8 cities will commit to 
participate and an additional 3-8 cities is possible.  If Hometown participates and the necessary 10 participants don’t 
commit, Hometown doesn’t lose anything.  However, you’ve calculated that 15 New Hamilton cities need to 
participate in order for Hometown to have a net gain in the project.  Each additional city, in excess of 15, that 
participates will decrease Hometown’s portion of the fixed costs and increase Hometown’s net benefit.  You also 
understand that if Hometown doesn’t participate and the required 10 cities are reached, Hometown may eventually 
experience all the benefits, with no cost to Hometown.   
 
 
Your Initial Decision: 
 
Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 7, whether you are more or less inclined to participate.  A score of ‘7’ indicates you 
are sure to participate and a score of ‘1’ indicates you are sure to not participate.  Do not read any farther before 
making your decision. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Don’t 
Participate   Undecided   Participate  
 
STOP.  Please don’t read further until you have made your initial decision.  Once your decision is made, turn 
over the page and do not go back to update your initial decision.   
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QUESTIONNAIRE (page 2) 
Please Complete and Return in Enclosed Reply Envelope 
 




Please review the following additional information.  The possible benefits and costs to Hometown remain the same 
as in the above description.   
 
New Hamilton’s regional council conducted a study of the Techno project and found that citizens in many New 
Hamilton cities will receive significantly (alternative model reads slightly) improved public services if the TechCo 
project is undertaken.  You review the list of the cities whose citizens are most likely to benefit from the TechCo 




Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 7, whether you are more or less inclined to participate.  A score of ‘7’ indicates you 
are sure to participate and a score of ‘1’ indicates you are sure to not participate.   
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Don’t 




1.  What is your title?   _____________________________ 
 
Elected Officials answer questions 2-4: 
2.  How many years have you been in your current position?  ____ 
3.  How often do you meet with elected officials outside of your jurisdiction to discuss regional programs/issues?  
____ 
4.  How much of your time as an elected official is spent working on regional programs/issues?  ____ 
 
Appointed Administrative Officials, Managers, and Department Directs answer questions 5-9: 
5.  How many years have you been in your current position?  ____ 
7.  How many total years have you been in the local government management profession?  ____ 
8.  How often do you meet with your administrative official counterparts in other jurisdictions to discuss regional 
programs/issues?  ____ 




10.  What is your age?  ____ 
 
11.  What is your gender?   
___  Male 
___  Female 
 
12.  Into which racial/ethnic category would you place yourself? 
___  African-American 
___  Asian-American 
___  Caucasian 
___  Hispanic 
___  Native American 
___  Other 
 
13.  Please indicate the highest level of education you have completed? 
___  High School degree 
___  Some college 
___  Four-year college degree 
___  Masters degree 
___  J.D. or equivalent 
___  Ph.D. or equivalent 
 
